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Abstract 
While governments the world over have been debating with how 
much vigour to pursue foreign investment projects, the New Zealand 
government has recently indicated a reduced appetite for this activity. 
It has maintained, even strengthened, its commitment to subsidize 
screen production projects coming to the country, but money to attract 
investments in other industries has been diverted to an outward 
investment strategy. In sharp contrast, local governments have lately 
shown a much greater willingness to subsidize cultural or sporting 
events in order to boost local economic activity. I evaluate under what 
circumstances it makes sense for a government to subsidize private 
investments. I pay particular attention to interjurisdictional 
competition, showing what governments should expect to pay when 
they join a bidding war, and derive the expected welfare gain. 
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“New Zealand needs to attract more and better quality foreign direct investment. […] The 
above suggests a clear role for government to […] attract investment with desirable 
characteristics through guaranteed access to government services and, where necessary, 
incentives that are closely aligned with the generation of spillover benefits.”  
Economic Development Minister, Jim Anderton (May 10, 2004) 
 
“We are therefore going to fine tune the inward investment programme. […] 
Specifically, we will discontinue the major grants and loan guarantees element of the 
Strategic Investment Fund. […] The second step, which I am announcing today, is a 
new focus on assisting firms to undertake outward investment.”  
Economic Development Minister, Trevor Mallard (August 30, 2007) 
 
 
1. Introduction 
An amazing thing happened on August 30, 2007 when Economic Development Minister 
Trevor Mallard announced a major change in policy direction. The Minister noted that 
“Research done by government officials shows that our stock of inward foreign direct 
investment (FDI) is similar, as a proportion of GDP, to those in other small developed 
economies. However, our stock of outward investment has declined and is now 
significantly below half of the OECD average.”1 In response, he announced that the 
government is changing focus. It will scrap the major grants and loan guarantees 
element of its Strategic Investment Fund, set up to lure foreign investors to New 
Zealand, and instead provide support to companies that expand offshore. In layman’s 
terms, funds are redirected from subsidizing foreign firms that invest in New Zealand to 
subsidizing New Zealand firms that invest overseas. 
Come again? This sounds like a tough sell with voters. Moreover, the change in 
policy comes at a time when 71 countries have made 208 changes to FDI laws; in 90% 
of the cases favourable to attracting FDI.2 Does the Minister know something that the 
rest of us don’t? At least he has done his homework. The change in policy was initiated 
after a review of Investment New Zealand’s (INZ) programmes, which is discussed 
below. The review revealed that over the last six years some programmes were unlikely 
to have provided good bang for the buck. 
In sharp contrast, local governments do not seem to share the Minister’s 
reluctance to chase private investment dollars. On November 19, 2007, Christchurch 
                                                 
1 Speech of the Honorable Trevor Mallard, Minister for Economic Development, to the Auckland 
Chamber of Commerce on August 30, 2007. 
2 Numbers refer to 2001 and are taken from Scott-Kennel (2004). 
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became the latest city council to make headlines with an aggressive move to attract a 
major event, luring the Ellerslie International Flower Show away from Auckland. 
Christchurch residents are surely asking themselves whether the rumoured one to three 
million dollars purchase price is really the best use of public funds.3 
This is exactly the question that I have been posed countless times in Canada over 
the past years; often by journalists, but also by fellow economists, friends, and even 
government officials. In Canada, the issue arose most frequently in response to large 
investment incentive packages for the automotive industry, but the question is universal. 
Under what circumstances, if any, is it good public policy to subsidize a private firm’s 
investment or more generally offer tax dollars to attract economic activity?  
Several papers in the economics literature have studied this very question, but the 
nature of academic research forces authors to limit attention to very specific situations 
and study just one or two specific factors. In contrast, in this article I intend to first 
provide an overview of the literature, which spans the fields of industrial, public, 
regional, and international economics, and zoom in on the question under what 
circumstances investment incentives can be defensible. I then introduce competition 
between jurisdictions and analyze a situation where governments engage in a bidding 
war to attract a private investment project. 
To preview the results, there are three important issues I want to highlight. To my 
fellow economists, who tend to be highly sceptical of government handouts like this, I 
would like to point out that a company’s location choice for a new investment can best 
be viewed as a Nash equilibrium in a game where different jurisdictions compete. Even 
though one locality might be the ideal place for the project, if it does not offer any 
subsidies at all it might very well lose the project to a more aggressive jurisdiction. 
Though one might deplore this type of tax competition, there is nothing that local 
officials can do about another jurisdiction’s behaviour.4  
To the voting public, who tend to view efforts to safeguard employment or attract 
economic activity more favourably, I would like to point out that there is an opportunity 
cost associated with government subsidies and with all other resources that will be 
consumed in the subsidized activity. If these types of interventions are to be welfare 
                                                 
3 The exact amount paid has not been disclosed, but reports in the media are in the quoted range (see 
various articles posted on www.stuff.co.nz on November 24, 2007). 
4 Explicit coordination is sometimes suggested as a solution, but this is not in all involved parties’ 
interest. Clearly, the losing jurisdiction will want to defect from a universal no-bidding strategy. 
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improving, they should not be zero-sum. There have to be externalities that raise the 
value of the resources devoted to these projects over and above their value in alternative 
uses. 
Even if a project is expected to create an externality that a local government 
values, competition from other jurisdictions will force a transfer of some of the benefits 
to the investing firm. I will show that the fraction of the benefits that the winning 
jurisdiction should expect to hold on to equals its unique advantage. Only to the extent 
that the project is uniquely suited to one locality, for example because (private) input 
costs are lower or because local (social) externalities are stronger, will the winning 
jurisdiction realize a new welfare gain from the bidding game. While the absolute size 
of the externality can be large, the net welfare gain is likely to be much smaller. 
These considerations lead me to the following three policy conclusions. First, 
given the strategic interaction with competing jurisdictions, it is not necessarily wasteful 
or inefficient for governments to bid for a private investment project. Second, given that 
the expected net welfare gain is determined by a location’s unique advantage, a pure 
rules-based policy is unlikely to always identify the appropriate strategy. Some 
discretion is valuable. Third, given that bidding is driven by the total externalities, but 
net welfare only by location-specific factors, overbidding can readily lead to a welfare 
loss. Governments should only enter the bidding game if they are confident to have 
estimated the benefits accurately. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 the case for 
intervention is reviewed, discussing the type of externalities proponents often anticipate 
and a number of concerns to caution the overzealous government. In Section 3, 
competition with other jurisdictions is introduced and the relative attractiveness, in 
terms of intrinsic costs and location-specific spillovers, takes centre stage. In Section 4, 
I review three important New Zealand policy areas in light of this analysis. Section 5 
concludes. 
 
2. The case for intervention 
Governments at all times and of all stripes have seen it within their mandates to try to 
attract economic activities to their area of jurisdiction. Incentive packages for large 
industrial investment projects are on offer the world over. Local governments are also 
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keen on using tax dollars to subsidize cultural or sports events, sometimes in the form of 
venues or promotional support, but often also as direct subsidies. 
Predictably, tax conservatives oppose such initiatives, while beneficiaries lobby 
hard. Economists are by and large sceptical of the possibility to realize welfare 
improvements in this way. Clearly, if input factors used in the production of the 
subsidized activity are rewarded at their true economic cost, including opportunity 
costs, and if firms are able to capture the entire value they generate, there is no role for 
subsidies. However, as I will discuss, either condition can fail in many circumstances.  
To argue credibly in favour of government intervention and justify handing over 
taxpayers’ money to a firm, one has to identify likely ‘externalities’—defined as 
unintended effects that are not captured in market prices. These might appear on the 
input side, if markets are pricing input factors incorrectly, or on the output side, if some 
benefits spill over to neighbouring firms or to the workforce as non-pecuniary benefits 
(Haaland and Wooton, 1996). 
Market prices for capital, labour, or land can diverge from their shadow costs 
because of regulation or excess capacity in a cyclical downturn. For example, existing 
government interventions, such as employment insurance, mandatory minimum wages, 
or workplace regulations, can lead to an undervaluation of employment benefits. Neven 
and Siotis (1993) refer to investment subsidies as a way of overcoming ‘strong 
distortions’ in the E.U. labour market. Barros and Cabral (2000) consider a situation 
where unemployment problems lead to a shadow wage below the nominal wage as an 
impetus for governments to subsidize FDI. 
Economic activities frequently generate spillovers that cannot all be captured by 
the firms. Again, these can exist on the input or on the output side. Take the automotive 
industry, one of the most visible recipients of investment subsidies as an example 
(Molot, 2005). On the input side, workers receive training in high-tech manufacturing 
activities, enhancing the local skill-pool and future employment prospects. In addition, 
wage rates in this industry are substantially above manufacturing wages in similar 
locations, with the difference too large to be explained entirely by human capital 
differences. The usual explanation is that the well-organized unions have been able to 
appropriate some of the market power rents in this oligopolistic industry. This mirrors 
arguments from the strategic trade literature: as there are economic profits in 
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oligopolistic or monopoly industries, the created value exceeds the resource costs and 
one would expect countries to compete to attract these industries (Brander and Spencer, 
1981).  
On the output side, there is a multiplier effect as the establishment of an assembly 
plant creates additional jobs in the parts sector. Given the importance of just-in-time 
inventory systems, supplier plants cannot locate too far away. Further agglomeration 
economies—e.g. availability of infrastructure, support services, or thick labour 
markets—will make the location more attractive for investments by other firms 
(Haaland and Wooton 1999). The automotive industry is also very R&D intensive and 
uses lots of advanced equipment. This creates demand for highly skilled support staff 
and can create direct benefits for nearby firms as advanced technology spills over 
(Greenstone, Hornbeck, and Moretti, 2007). 
Even if one can be confident that externalities are present, caution is required. At 
least five concerns can be identified. First, firms are surprisingly capable at internalizing 
externalities. This is particularly relevant for the technology spillover arguments. To the 
extent that workers acquire skills that are not firm-specific, their employers might be 
able to reduce wages as workers realize the investment aspect of working for a high-
tech firm. Locating near a high-tech firm in the hope of benefiting from technology 
spillovers also runs the risk that talented employees are lost to the high-tech rival 
employer. 
Second, even if sizable externalities are expected, they might not materialize ex 
post. Blomström and Kokko (2003) discuss a lot of evidence, often from developing 
countries, that local firms can fail to absorb the technology and skills from the firms 
attracted by investment incentives. They conclude that incentives are an inefficient 
instrument to raise the local technology level.  
Third, the argument in support of government subsidies to attract investment also 
applies in reverse: existing firms will apply for subsidies in order not to locate away. 
Once a government acquires a reputation for being amenable to the provision of 
subsidies, local firms might try to exploit this even if they are not seriously 
contemplating to relocate. A frequent response is to tie incentives to pre-established 
rules, but this limits government’s ability to seek out the most valuable projects or leads 
to subsidies for investments that were never in doubt. 
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Fourth, measuring the size of externalities is extremely tricky, since by their very 
nature they are not captured in prices. Cost-benefit analyses to evaluate the expected 
benefits tend to be hotly debated and estimates of likely benefits often cover a wide 
range. Greenstone and Moretti (2004) recently developed an ingenious way to estimate 
spillover effects of investments on a local economy, doing away with the need for 
distinguishing between the market price and shadow cost of factor inputs. They exploit 
the fact that local property values will capture the present discounted value of the expect 
profit stream of living in a locality. By matching the locations that were selected as the 
site of a large industrial project with the runner-up locations that (narrowly) lost out, 
they construct a natural experiment set-up. The maintained assumption is that after a 
protracted site selection process, the last-round choice between the final two locations is 
random, due to idiosyncratic factors. It is thus assumed that in the absence of the 
investment project the two locations had the same future prospects. 
In a sample of 92 counties, the authors find that increases in property values are 
approximately 1.1% to 1.7% higher in ‘winning’ versus ‘losing’ counties and that the 
difference is statistically significant. Some net benefits of attracting these investments 
seem to exist, taking all relevant costs into account. The authors also find a 1.5% 
relative trend break in labour earnings in the new plant's industry in winning counties, 
suggesting at least one channel for the benefits. The results undermine the critics’ view 
that the provision of local subsidies to attract large industrial plants has reduced local 
residents’ welfare in these instances. Unfortunately, this approach cannot be used to 
estimate possible benefits ex ante. 
The fifth and final concern is that especially in situations where externalities are 
large and less uncertain—and the previous concerns are of lesser importance—an 
interested government is likely to face competition. In such a competitive situation, the 
externality-argument has to be qualified. Rather than the total size of the externalities, 
which has been the focus of the literature, it is the fraction of externalities that is unique 
to a particular location that really matters. I discuss this in detail in the next section. 
 
3. Competition for projects 
If an investment project is expected to generate local benefits over and beyond its 
resource costs, it is likely to be pursued by many. Jurisdictions will engage in a bidding 
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war to attract the project, offering competing incentive packages to increase the relative 
attractiveness of their locality. As a result, some of the potential benefits (externalities) 
will be competed away, or rather, will be transferred to the firm making the location 
decision. As outright cash grants to companies are a hard sell with voters, incentives 
often take the form of tax breaks, land grants, provision of infrastructure, or training 
subsidies. 
A number of papers have studied the competition for FDI or other large 
investment projects in a strategic framework using noncooperative game theory. One of 
the first is Black and Hoyt (1989) who argue that the average cost pricing of public 
services through taxation exceeds the marginal cost of providing the services, providing 
a role for subsidies, in terms of tax cuts or additional service provision, to achieve 
efficient location decisions.5 Barros and Cabral (2000) illustrate that even though an 
outcome with jointly determined first-best subsidies dominates the Nash equilibrium in 
terms of aggregate welfare (combining both bidders), individual bidders will want to 
defect. It is thus a typical prisoner’s dilemma situation. 
The model in Head, Ries, and Swenson (1999), where U.S. states compete to 
attract Japanese firms’ investments in North America, provides a set-up similar to mine. 
While they focus on agglomeration effects and model externalities endogenously, I will 
simply posit differences in relative costs and externalities for two jurisdictions and 
derive the equilibrium bids and location choice. 
Figure 1 provides a graphical illustration of the equilibrium of a typical bidding 
game. Consider a situation where New Zealand and Australia are competing to attract 
the production of a large budget movie picture. Two difference are crucial to derive the 
optimal bidding strategies of the competing jurisdictions: (i) the relative intrinsic value 
of both locations to the firm, i.e. the difference in net private values; and (ii) the relative 
size of the externalities, the difference in social benefits associated with the project.  
In this hypothetical example, I have assumed that the private value of the project 
is higher in New Zealand than in Australia, for example because of lower wages. The 
difference is denoted by A on the horizontal axis. In the absence of subsidies the 
producer would prefer to shoot his picture in New Zealand. 
                                                 
5 Several papers in the public finance literature subsequently studied the relative efficiency of competition 
in taxes or service provision, see for example Bayindir-Upmann (1998). Haaparanta (1996) provides a 
more sophisticated treatment of the bidding game in a common agency set-up, letting firms compete 
using menu auctions. 
 8
Figure 1: An illustration of the optimal subsidies offered
New  Optimal 
Zealand Australian 
subsidy strategy
SBNZ Optimal New Zealand strategy
 (B)  (B)
SBAU
  (A)
Winning
NZ  (A)+(B): spillovers that New Zealand
subsidy can hold on to
(A) SBAU Australian subsidy
Relative private 
advantage of locating 
in New Zealand
Difference in social benefits 
(externalities) of locating in 
New Zealand
 
It is also assumed that the production of the motion picture generates local 
externalities, indicated on the respective axes, which exceed the intrinsic cost difference 
A. As a result, the Australian government has an incentive to attract the production by 
offering an incentive package of at least A. For now, I assume that these externalities are 
even higher in New Zealand (SBNZ >SBAU ), perhaps because the shadow price of labour 
is lower, such that the New Zealand government has an incentive to trump any rational 
Australian bid. 
Figure 1 illustrates the best response functions for both governments, i.e. the 
optimal bidding strategy as a function of the other government’s bid. These are similar 
to Bertrand-Nash optimal price strategies discussed in any industrial organization 
textbook. The best response function for the Australian government is indicated by the 
solid black line. It bids A more than New Zealand up to the value of its own local 
externalities, the vertical solid line at SBAU. The New Zealand government is only 
compelled to offer incentives if the Australian package is sufficient to outweigh its own 
intrinsic advantage of A. Above this level it matches its rival’s offer cent for cent, 
indicated by the dashed line, up to its own local social benefit level SBNZ, the horizontal 
section of the New Zealand best response function. 
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The intersection of the two best response functions gives the equilibrium subsidy. 
The winning jurisdiction does not have to offer its entire surplus, only enough to make 
the firm indifferent between itself and the next best alternative. The runner-up 
jurisdiction, however, only drops out of the bidding war after offering the entire surplus 
it could have expected from the investment. 
In this particular situation, the equilibrium is for New Zealand to attract the 
investment, offering an incentive package worth SBAU – A. The net welfare gain from 
the project to the New Zealand economy will thus equal SBNZ diminished by its bid or 
A+B. In equilibrium, the winning jurisdiction is expected only to retain the difference 
between its own private and social benefits and the corresponding benefits in the 
runner-up location. 
Two crucial insights can be taken away from this example. First, even though the 
value to the local economy of the project might be large, a significant fraction of it will 
accrue to the firm making the investment in the form of incentives offered. The net 
welfare gain for New Zealand falls short of the full social surplus by the amount of 
surplus that would potentially be generated in Australia minus the intrinsic New 
Zealand cost advantage. 
Still, in their study of welfare effects associated with the attraction of “million 
dollar plants,” Greenstone and Moretti (2004) explicitly mention that they expected 
jurisdictional competition to have competed away all welfare benefits. They were 
surprised to find some remaining positive effects. My analysis suggests that if spillovers 
exist, a fraction equal to the unique advantage of the location, either a private benefit to 
the firm or a local economy-specific social benefit, will remain as a net local welfare 
gain. 
Second, even if one jurisdiction is the logical place for the project in the absence 
of competition, it does not mean that abstaining from the bidding war is the optimal 
strategy. In the current example, New Zealand has an intrinsic cost advantage and 
spillovers will be larger, but without a New Zealand bid an Australian incentive package 
worth A would succeed in attracting the project, for a net welfare gain over there. 
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Figure 2: Optimal subsidies when Australian externalities dominate
New  Optimal 
Zealand Australian 
subsidy strategy
SBAU
  (-B)
SBNZ Optimal New Zealand strategy
   (B)-(A): spillovers that Australia
can hold on to
(A) Winning Australian subsidy
Australian
subsidy
Relative private 
advantage of locating 
in New Zealand
Difference in social benefits 
(externalities) of locating in 
New Zealand
 
An additional insight can be gained by considering a minor change to the 
example. If externalities in Australia were larger than in New Zealand, for example 
because of idle capacity in production studios there, New Zealand would have to bid 
more aggressively to attract the project. The relative size of the private difference, 
favouring New Zealand, and the social difference, favouring Australia, would then 
determine which country succeeds in attracting the project. As long as the difference 
between the Australian and New Zealand externality is less than A, New Zealand still 
attracts the project for a net welfare gain of A + B or A – |B|, as B still defined as SBNZ – 
SBAU is now negative. 
Externalities in Australia might even be sufficiently large to outweigh the intrinsic 
private advantage of locating in New Zealand, a situation depicted in Figure 2. The 
winning Australian bid now becomes SBNZ + A, and the net welfare gain for Australia is 
– (A + B) or |B| – A. Crucially, while the surplus generated might be quite large, only a 
minor fraction will accrue to the local economy. The majority is now transferred to the 
firm.  
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The third insight is that while bids are based on the absolute level of social 
benefits, the net welfare gain, factoring in the incentives, is determined by the difference 
in values for the two jurisdictions. With uncertainty about the absolute level of benefits, 
overbidding even by a small percentage can easily lead to a reduction in local welfare.  
If externalities are generated endogenously, one can imagine an equilibrium 
situation as follows. A new investment creates positive externalities that are increasing 
in the level of local activity, for example through technology spillovers on existing 
firms. At the same time, the induced labour demand pushes up local wages more if the 
local activity level is high, for example because of capacity constraints in the labour 
market. Compared to locating an investment project in a sparse area, a firm that chooses 
a dense area generates higher social benefits (B>0), but incurs larger private costs 
(A<0).  
In order to entice any firm to locate in the dense area, the local government needs 
to offer some of the externalities as an incentive package. In equilibrium, the full value 
of the externalities will be offered, with an optimal bid equal to B and |A|, and firms will 
be indifferent where to locate. The distribution of economic activity is then determined 
by the nature of demand and spillover effects, i.e. how rapidly they increase with the 
local activity level and when diminishing returns set in. Head et al. (1999) is one 
illustration of such equilibrium. 
 
4. Applications 
4.1 Review of Investment New Zealand 
In 2007, the Ministry of Economic Development reviewed activities by Investment New 
Zealand (INZ) to promote inward investment. The principal finding was that “there is a 
well founded role for government in assisting firms to attract quality investment that can 
generate positive spillovers. The evaluations have found, however, that Investment New 
Zealand’s performance to date has been modest, although its investment attraction 
model is sound.” (p. 1, MED Cabinet Paper 2007) 
In response, the Major Grants and Loan component of the Strategic Investment 
Fund was discontinued and the funds will be used to support feasibility studies into 
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proposals that will support economic transformations. One area that is actively pursued 
is the support of outward investment activities by New Zealand firms.6  
This retreat comes only a couple of years after the original program was rolled out 
with high level support and great expectations. A Boston Consulting Group report in 
2001 stressed that all other small countries actively targeted FDI into a few sectors and 
suggested two areas where New Zealand had high potential. More recently, the New 
Zealand Institute highlights “attracting FDI” as one of the prime areas where the New 
Zealand government should take action to position itself for competition in the 
weightless economy. Other notables and institutions—Michael Porter, WTO, and the 
OECD—have weighed in positively on the issue of attracting FDI. 7 
My expectation was that the review must have unearthed some heady stuff to lead 
to such a dramatic policy reversal. While it is clearly commendable that the program 
received an early review and that the government acted quickly to implement its 
suggestions, reading through the actual review (MED, 2007) instills much less 
confidence in the decision making.  
After a well-argued discussion of the potential benefits of FDI—highlighting 
externalities—and a few interesting case studies, the bulk of the review amounts to a 
simple accounting exercise describing the different projects with some summary 
statistics. The dollars and cents picture that emerges is the following: the Major Grants 
and Loan component of INZ can be held responsible for $155 million worth of 
investments out of the $600 million total in projects it was involved with.8 Given its 
total cost of approximately $60 million, this is unlikely to be a good return on 
investment. End of the quantitative part of the review. 
As for identifying the externalities or spillovers associated with investments, the 
recipients of the funds are asked to report to what extent their investments had a 
“significant potential to enhance the productive capacity of the New Zealand economy.” 
                                                 
6 The Visitor Investment Program and the Feasibility Studies components are continued unchanged. 
7 These endorsements can be found online at http://www.nzinstitute.org (New Zealand Institute), 
http://www.isc.hbs.edu/caon new zealand 2001 presentation 08-04-01 ck1.pdf (Michael Porter), 
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/tpr_e/tp214_e.htm (WTO). The 2003 OECD Economic Survey on 
New Zealand recommended the creation of a more favourable tax treatment of FDI, the 2005 survey 
suggested lessening restrictions on foreign ownership, and the 2007 survey highlighted the risk of 
currency volatility as a deterrent of FDI. 
8 To arrive at that number, the revealed importance (through interviews) of INZ in attracting the 
investment is used to assign a fraction of the total investment to the agency: 90% if role was critical, 20% 
if large, 5% for a minor role. 
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Not surprisingly high scores abound. It reminds me of the final reports I have to submit 
on my own academic research grants. They always ask me to report whether the 
research was “top notch” and whether the received funds were “crucial in completing 
the research program.” Does anyone ever say no? 
This seems a far cry from the much more sophisticated approach of Moretti and 
Greenstone (2004) that was reviewed above. One would hope that the agency itself does 
a more thorough investigation of the potential spillover effects before committing 
money. Which leads to the question why the reviewers never used the internal 
information that was gathered before funding was awarded? Or even more to the point: 
why is there no discussion in the review of the quality of INZ’s methodology to 
estimate expected future benefits?  
It is only mentioned that for the program to break even, each investment project 
should generate externalities at a rate of 13 cents for each dollar invested for three 
years.9 No attempt is made to assess the difference in likely spillovers from the 49% 
invested in wood processing versus the remaining investments in specialized 
manufacturing, biotechnology, ICT, and R&D. Given a projected investment value of 
$3.4 billion for the cases still under active management by INZ, a more thoughtful 
tallying of expected benefits seems valuable. 
In particular, the analysis in the previous section suggests that assuming likely 
externalities to be proportional to the amount of money invested makes bidding for 
these projects a dicey proposal. If the externalities that New Zealand anticipates are 
similar to those that would be generated in competing countries vying to attract the 
project, the previous analysis suggests that the net welfare gain will be close to zero. 
Overbidding will directly lead to a reduction in national welfare. 
One interesting feature of the investments with INZ involvement is that all 
projects are of the “brownfield” variety, i.e. foreign investors buying up existing assets 
or infusing new money in existing businesses. This type of investment is often deplored 
in the media as a loss of control of the domestic industry. However, Javorcik (2004) 
argues that brownfield FDI in the form of a merger or joint venture could maximise the 
potential for technology spillovers. The review explicitly mentions positive effects in 
terms of global market outlets and better management, but it does not dig deeper. This 
                                                 
9 A return of 39% (3 x 13%) on an investment of $155 million is just sufficient to recoup the $60 million 
expense. 
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seems one area where a more thorough look at the nature of the externalities could have 
addressed a popular misperception. 
Another thing one does learn from the review is that there simply is not a whole 
lot of action on the FDI front in New Zealand. Over a four year period, 19 projects were 
brought to fruition, excluding screen productions but including unverified investments, 
for a total investment of $600 million. In contrast, in 2004 the Canadian province of 
Ontario launched a five-year fund to dish out $500 million CAD ($650m NZD) to 
subsidize automotive investments in the province at a rate of 10%; an amount that was 
later doubled by a similar federal program. Investments of less than $300 million CAD 
(which would include all investments in the INZ review) or involving less than 300 jobs 
need not apply. In only two years all the funds had been committed.10 
 
4.2 Movie subsidies 
One important sector where New Zealand has been successful in attracting foreign 
projects is in the screen productions industry. Most (in)famously, the filming of the 
Lord of the Rings trilogy not only put the New Zealand industry on the map, but also 
generated very large tax breaks for New Line Cinema—estimated in the $300-400 
million range by the OECD. In 2003, the ad hoc tax shelter was replaced by the Large 
Budget Screen Production Grant scheme, providing direct subsidies to moviemakers 
subject to a number of conditions, most notably minimum scale and New Zealand local 
content rules. From 2003 to 2006, nine major projects were attracted at a total subsidy 
cost of $90.4 million. 
New Zealand has always faced competition from other countries in attracting 
these projects. The scheme even explicitly targets large productions as these are likely 
to be more willing to relocate internationally in response to incentive packages. The 
establishment of a similar Refundable Film Tax Offset program in Australia started 
something of a bidding war. When the Australian program was improved (and renamed 
Location Rebate) the New Zealand government quickly retaliated, making its own 
program more generous as well. In particular, the subsidy rate was increased from 
                                                 
10 While these funds were not limited to foreign firms, the bulk was taken up by investments in new or 
existing foreign-owned assembly plants. 
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12.5% to 15%, bundling of projects to reach the minimum threshold was allowed, and 
the domestic content rules were relaxed. 
In press statements, the government is quick to point out that these projects 
“contribute a lot of jobs” and represent a lot of economic activity touching on many 
sectors. In more thoughtful reviews, the focus is on the likely spillovers, but it is clearly 
difficult to assess how large the externalities could be. Moreover, the preceding analysis 
suggests that from a welfare point of view it is even more pressing to assess to what 
extent the benefits—private or social—are unique to New Zealand.  
Two arguments stand out. A first is an infant industry argument, invoking a 
market failure. New Zealand might have a comparative advantage in this activity, but 
foreign production companies do not know this (initially). Government subsidies have 
the potential to jumpstart the industry, with big, successful productions having a 
demonstration effect. This logic would suggest that the subsidies could be phased out 
after a while.  
The emergence of a vibrant and reputed industry in New Zealand boosts the 
intrinsic value of filming in the country, the A quantities in Figures 1 and 2, which 
reduces the subsidy required to attract a new project. The review of INZ did suggest that 
the market failure argument has increasingly less bite and that the marginal benefit of 
further expenditure in the screen production industry is reduced. This did not stop the 
government from pouring more money into the granting scheme, which operates 
independently of the INZ programmes, and from extending its timeline. 
One could envision a dynamic equilibrium where current investments build on 
past investments to generate endogenous spillovers, but continuous subsidies are needed 
to overcome a private cost disadvantage. The model of positive agglomeration 
externalities combined with negative labour market effects in Head et al. (1999) is one 
such example. In the screen productions case, subsidies could be needed to overcome a 
distance disadvantage; while each new project contributes to a (depreciating) reputation 
for the New Zealand film industry and generates spillovers for future projects in this 
way. 
A second argument is that attracting movie pictures has the additional benefit of 
showcasing the country as an attractive tourist destination. There is no doubt that the 
filming of the Lord of the Rings trilogy has boosted New Zealand’s reputation as an 
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attractive holiday destination, but in comparison with annual appropriations for tourism 
of around $80 million, the subsidies look enormous. In addition, this argument would 
suggest that the content of the film should feature in the decision process, which 
naturally is a road any government is reluctant to go down. 
Less obvious is the absence of any criteria linked to the facilitation of “skills 
development and technology transfer within the local screen production industry,” an 
explicit objective of the granting scheme. The recent loan agreement given to the 
company Right Hemisphere to support the local 3D digital content and graphics 
industry is more in line with this objective, but this seems to have been an ad hoc 
initiative. Another recent step in this direction was to allow productions undertaking 
only post, digital, and visual effects in New Zealand limited access to the granting 
scheme.  
 
4.3 Local government competition 
A third area of government policy that fits the framework of this paper is the 
competition between local governments to stage sporting or cultural events.11 New 
Zealand has recently witnessed several examples of interjurisdictional bidding to attract 
these events and they are invariably followed by a public outcry over the appropriate 
use of tax dollars. 
The most striking example was the successful bid of the Christchurch city council 
to lure the Ellerslie International Flower Show away from Auckland. The actual 
(purchase) offer was not disclosed, but almost certain to have exceeded $1 million (see 
footnote 3). In previous years, the Auckland regional council had provided annual 
subsidies to the show of $90,000 in the form of a sponsorship and more in kind. 
Hamilton was another locality considering putting together a bid for future hosting 
rights as the contract with Auckland was up for renewal. 
Other examples include the Wellington city council’s attraction of the Montana 
World of WearableArts (WOW) Awards Show from Nelson in 2005, in return for venue 
and marketing support. The same council contributed a subsidy, rumoured to be around 
$300,000, for the 2007 exhibition soccer game between the Wellington Phoenix and 
                                                 
11 Local governments subsidizing sports stadiums are a perennial favourite in this type of local bidding 
games. 
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David Beckham’s Los Angeles Galaxy. Mayor Prendergast indicated that two other 
New Zealand cities had expressed interest to host the match. The Hamilton city council 
managed to secure the exclusive New Zealand hosting rights for a V8 Supercar event 
for seven years (2008-2014) beating out national and international competitors. 
Previously, an economic impact assessment for the race had been carried out for the 
Wellington area. 
To assess the wisdom or folly of these bidding wars, one again has to contemplate 
to what extent likely benefits—private or social—are unique to one jurisdiction. Mayor 
Michael Redman said “there is no reason to believe the return for Hamilton would be 
any less than the amount forecasted in the Wellington economic impact assessment,” 
which seems exactly to be missing the point. It only means that in a bidding war with 
Wellington, Hamilton is competitive, but it does not point to any possible welfare gains 
from winning the war. 
 In some other instances, the uniqueness of spillovers entered the debate 
explicitly. The Wellington city council indicated it considered itself a better fit than 
other jurisdictions both for the WOW awards, given its international airport and upscale 
city reputation, and for the Beckham game, given the (future) local fan base for the 
Wellington Phoenix. So even if the private value was similar to that for other locations, 
it would be beneficial to offer some incentives to swing the decision in its favour and 
capture the externalities.  
Mayor Bob Parker also referred to the reputation of Christchurch as “the garden 
city” as a natural fit to host the pre-eminent New Zealand gardening show. While the 
social externalities, in terms of reputation and tourism, might be highest, the voiced 
discontent from many firms expecting to display at the show suggests that there might 
be an intrinsic cost disadvantage as well for the South Island locality. As such, the 
situation would correspond to that depicted in Figure 2, with Christchurch in the role of 
Australia. While the positive difference in social benefits might exceed the negative 
difference in private benefits, the risk of overpaying seems especially great in a situation 
like this. 
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5. Policy conclusions 
The practice of governments bidding for private investment dollars is clearly not going 
away. From an individual jurisdiction’s perspective, this is not necessarily a bad thing, 
at least if demonstrable externalities are at stake. While offering no incentives is 
certainly ideal as long as the project is not lost to a competing jurisdiction, any package 
up to the full value of expected externalities is rational if it is needed to retain the 
project. Even if coordination to avoid so-called “wasteful tax competition that transfers 
social benefits to firms” were possible, it would not necessarily be optimal as 
competition leads to more efficient location decisions.  
Furthermore, for governments engaging in these bidding wars, I would like to 
highlight two practical lessons one can take away from the analysis. First, even though 
the absolute level of the optimal incentive package can be as large as the total value of 
externalities, the winning jurisdiction will only be able to capture the fraction of 
externalities that corresponds to its unique local advantages. Overestimating the value 
of externalities can easily lead to a welfare loss. If a government is not committed to 
getting the estimates right, it should stay out of the game. 
Second, while government discretion is often viewed with suspicion on political 
economy grounds, it is unlikely that a pure rules-based approach will generate many 
benefits in these situations. The net welfare gain from the subsidy game amounts to the 
location-specific portion of the private and social benefits. It is hard to imagine a fixed 
set of rules being able to identify projects in which a locality has a particular advantage 
and to determine the optimal bidding strategy. If government discretion is not tolerated, 
entering a bidding war can easily lead to the winner’s curse: only those projects will be 
won for which the ex post externalities fall below those predicted by the ex ante rules.  
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